| The issue of religion
and religious education presents itself within different contexts in Western
European countries, which are derived from prevailing political cultures.
In Germany for example, despite the wide spread
image of being a secularised society, the Christian Churches’ entanglements
in the state and vice versa are quite far-reaching. The German Constitution’s
Preamble cites the trust in God as the moral basis and ends up with enormous
financial support that is collected by the state and spended for the benefit
of Christian Churches, making religion actually an important power in Germany.
The range of privileges that the Christian Churches enjoy seems to be unparalleled
with other European countries. There is a sharp contrast with France for
example. The German case can be likened to the case in the United Kingdom
where the Crown is the head of the Anglican Church, giving it power and
legitimacy. This recognition is reflected in the composition of the House
of Lords, a number of seats being held by the clergy of the Anglican Church.
Religious and political power in Germany were not separated as early as
elsewhere, but the Christian Churches, namely the Lutheran Protestants
kept on having a say in public initiatives that would for example in France
have belonged exclusively to the sphere of the state; the Churches were
especially involved in the construction of the educational system (Max-Planck-Institut
1990: 51)
In spite of the process of secularisation that
has meanwhile taken place, Christianity still serves as powerful moral
reference basis and enjoys privileges in education. Christianity and those
movements in society which have been substantial for the development towards
humanism, freedom and democracy get their appropriate space in educating
citizens with a consciousness of their own. Religious education in schools
is a regular element and it has to be stressed that it is not inter-religious
education but a confessional doctrine. The German Constitution guarantees
religious education as a regular subject in public schools, this being
put into practice by the churches in the frame of subsidiarity (Grundgesetz
Articles 7.2 and 140, 141). The Berlin Statutes on the other hand ask the
schools to provide for religious education (two lessons per week) and a
room for it free of costs. Consequently, the general framing regulations
for schools in Berlin recognize the churches as partners for educational
co-operation.
All confessional courses are subject to free choice.
Islamic religious education though does not take place at regular public
schools in Germany. Usually, the reason that is given for the absence of
Islamic religious education by School Authorities is that Muslims in Germany
do not have a common institution like the Christian Churches which could
be treated as an educational partner corresponding to the principle of
subsidiarity. An exception to the negative attitude is the pragmatic development
of an Islamic curriculum in the Bundesland of Nordrhein-Westfalen
which had been initiated by the applications of three Islamic organisations
to conduct their lessons in public schools. An alternative for Muslim organisations
is the foundation of their own confessional private schools.
This status of religious education as inculcation
of Christian heritage is contrasting to French case where a deeply rooted
laicism does not accommodate the appearance of religious signs in public
institutions because religion is considered to be a matter of private choice
and conviction. One can, on the other hand, draw some parallels with the
British case where Christianity, Protestant confessionalism, is seen as
a source of British identity/imaginary. Especially at the beginning of
the 19th Century the British self image was predominantly 'Protestant'
in nature. For many people, a century later this conception still remained
intact. (Robbins, 1993: 265) This image was confirmed by a leading article
in The Times on 8 July 1980, writing that 'The Church of England
is the British national Church'. The Rushdie affair was a test case
in Britain, showing that modern Britain was not as much a secularised society
as one imagined. With the Rushdie affair, Islam emerged in the public sphere
as a powerful tradition, contesting the tolerance at the core of the British
identity. As Ignatieff (1998:20) observes, Islam made people realise that
civic tolerance, as one component of the much-praised core of the British
identity, was less secular than may people had supposed. He argues that
"the
almost forgotten Protestantism within the British identity came to the
surface. It is the Christian faith, which the Crown is supposed to defend…
It was Islam, which broke a key silence in British national identity: why
a secular society fails to separate church and state altogether?" As
will be seen later in the article, this failure showed up itself once more
in the 1988 Education Reform Act that made religious education compulsory
with a main emphasis on Christianity as an important heritage and source
of national imagery.
The institutionalisation of religious education
(RE) in general and of Islamic education in particular took place differently
in Britain than Germany. While in German public schools the Constitution
is guaranteeing Christian religious education, in the UK it is not the
Constitution (there is none) but The Education Reform Act (ERA) 1988 which
enforces religious education in public schools. According to this ERA the
nature of religious education should be dominantly Christian; other religions
though in Britain should also be taken into consideration. It is the responsibility
of the local Standing Advisory Councils on Religious Education (SACRE)
to advise the authority upon matters connected with religious worship in
county schools and the religious education in public schools. Concerning
the content of RE a different picture emerges in contrast to other compulsory
subjects in the National Curriculum. In contrast to the centralisation
of the education system through the National Curriculum, RE was decentralised,
acknowledging the diversity of religious traditions in Britain.
The formation of SACRE's led to the production
of an agreed syllabus that also accommodated diverse religions in addition
to Christianity. An agreed syllabus is required "to reflect the fact
that the religious traditions of Great Britain are in the main Christian,
while taking account of the teachings and practices of the other principal
religions represented in Great Britain". The content of the agreed
syllabus is influenced by the religions of ethnic communities. Hinduism,
Islam and Buddhism were also included in the study of religions. The most
significant aspect of religious education in relation to civil culture
is expected to promote peace and toleration which fits well with the general
image of Britishness being tolerant. One can argue that religious education
which represents religions as beliefs systems rather than cultural and
political belonging has a potential to stimulate a better understanding
of "others", leading to mutual respect and acceptance. This rather contrasts
to the Dutch tradition where other religions are portrayed as 'far away'
cultures. A research report by Verma, Zec and Skinner (1992; cited in Skinner,
1993: 66) lends support to this observation in the British context. The
research results indicate that pupils are most likely to learn other’s
cultures, religions and discuss these issues in an open manner, building
friendship and countering prejudice.
Muslims in Britain as elsewhere in Europe are getting
organised to provide Islamic education for their children in their own
schools as well as campaigning for more Muslim teachers in public schools.
The daily act of collective worship and the content of religious education
have become important concerns for Muslim parents. One of the responses
of Muslims to the recent developments in the area of education was to establish
their own private and independent Islamic schools where not only the National
Curriculum subjects but also cultural and religious subjects would be taught.
Muslims also want to make use of state funds, that are presently available
for denominational and Jewish schools. In order to become voluntary-aided
schools the Zakaria Girls' School in Batley and the Islamia School in London,
for example, made applications in 1982. However, Zakaria Girls' and the
Islamia School failed to receive recognition as a voluntary-aided school.
(Dwyer & Meyer, 1995: 45). After the Labour Party's rise to the government,
Muslims increased their pressure on authorities for recognition, which
is completely unthinkable in France. Despite earlier rejections of its
application, the Islamia School persisted in its effort to receive state
funds. In a letter published in the education supplement of The Guardian,
leading figures campaigning for this state funding appealed to the Secretary
of Education and Employment, David Blunkett, for Muslims to be treated
equally with others in Britain (2 December 1997). It is argued in the letter
that Government backing of Muslim schools would promote shared values and
good citizenship for all communities equally. In response to Muslims' demands,
the Government decided (9 January 1998) to grant state funding to the Islamia
School in London and Al Furqan School in Birmingham. The same day, two
more Jewish Schools, Mathidla Marks Kennedy and Jewish Progressive primary
schools were also given grant-maintained status.
In the Netherlands on the other hand, there is
no compulsory explicit religious (Christian) education in public schools.
There is, however, an implicit emphasis on the Christian world in history
lessons. This emphasis on the Christian world echoes the dominant position
of Christian establishments in Germany and Britain representing a shared
past. All chapters in history books dealing with 'our' world and 'our'
civilization also make references to aspects of Christianity. As far as
explicit aspects of Christianity are concerned, it is a typical history
subject.
What Britain and The Netherlands have in common
is the fact that both countries made available state funds to Muslim schools.
It seems that Muslims in the Netherlands achieved their goals more easily.
Despite local opposition, Muslims in The Netherlands succeeded in opening
state-funded Islamic schools in Rotterdam and Eindhoven in 1988, and over
the last six years, the number of Islamic schools has steadily increased
in this country to six in 1989-1990, 22 in 1991-92 (Shadid and van Koningsveld,
1992: 109) and 29 in the 1993-1994 school-year. All of these are primary
schools (Dwyer and Meyer, 1995:40-41).
France can be singled out regarding religion-state
relations. Religious education is not a matter of concern in French public
schools at all. The principle of laïcité, understood
in the sense of neutrality towards religious convictions, means that there
should be no religious signs in public schools. There is no religious education
and crosses or other religious symbols are not allowed in public schools.
The wearing of headscarves in most public schools has been forbidden in
the name of this principle. Religious education in French public schools
is not even imaginable. Religious questions in the public school are not
treated as a matter of culture or merely as a belief system but as a matter
of civilisation and historical knowledge.
Issues of religion appear for example when the
foundations of modern civilisation and the influence of oriental civilisation
on the western world are discussed. However, Christianity is represented
as a strong marker on Western civilisation. Books in the French schools
refer to 'our language', 'our customs', 'our cultural past', 'our environment'
that carry the imprint of Christian traditions. The implication of this
narrative is that, although French society is secular, Christianity is
marking the repertoire of French discourse despite the calculated distance
shown in the books.
This article shows that there is a striking difference
in the position of religious education and in the extent to which religion
is present in the curriculum in Germany, Britain, France and the Netherlands.
These differences are to a large extent related to the different political
cultures and dominant discourses in the respective countries. In Germany
and Britain religious education is more or less a standard ingredient of
the curriculum. In both cases religious moral issues are considered to
be essential in order to educate citizens and build up identity. Although
in Britain religious education is compulsory and is mainly based on Christianity,
other religions as well are recognized and taught. In Germany, on the other
hand, the idea of a Christian genealogy shines through. In the French case
there is no religious education in public schools because French political
culture refuses any state involvement; religious education and nurturing
spirituality for religion is considered to be a matter of individual conviction
that should not interfere in public sphere. In the Netherlands the situation
is somewhat different, although in that country as well there is no compulsory
or formally prescribed religious education. Despite the fact that there
is no provision for religious education in the two countries, religion
nevertheless is present in other subjects. Christian values and influences
appear to be the dominant religious heritage whether it is explicitly codified
or implicitly implied in the narratives.
On the other hand there is an interesting similarity
in the German and French approaches as opposed to the British and Dutch
ones. Whereas both Germany and France place one moral standard applicable
to all citizens above others, i. e. Christianity in Germany and rationality
in France (the latter by means of compulsory philosophy lessons), Britain
and the Netherlands seem to relate moral standards to the religious and
cultural diversity in society. Dutch political culture established a system,
implying that one should teach one's own morals in one'n own confessional
"pillar" (Protestant, Catholic, etc.) within an overarching (universal)
system of equality and non-discrimination. The British political culture
on the other encourages the education of morals which should be organised
in accordance with the multicultural and multi-religious characteristics
of society because British society is composed of communities of values
rather than constituting one community of origins as it is the case with
Germany.
_____________________________
Bibliography
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New
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Update:
November 1, 2005